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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior commentators have consistently found the majority of
American court systems staunchly adhering to the "traditional" un-
modified duty of the attorney to represent indigents upon appoint-
ment by the court regardless of the availability of any compensation
for such service.1 But "[w]hat was a minor nuisance for the Nine-
teenth Century lawyer has become an awesome burden for the law-
yers in smaller counties during the latter half of the Twentieth
1. See D. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735, 754-
56 (1980); Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncom-
pensated Legal Assistance, 81 CoLum. L. Ray. 366, 371 (1981) (authored by Bruce Andrew Green)
[hereinafter Note, Court Appointment]; Note, Uncompensated Appointments of Attorneys for Indigent
Criminal Defense: The Need for Supreme Court Standards, 14 Sw. U.L. Ray. 389, 393 (1984) (au-
thored by Victoria R. Kendrick) [hereinafter Note, Uncompensated Appointments]; Annotation, Right
of Attorney Appointed by Court for Indigent Accused to, and Court's Power to Award, Compensation
by Public, in Absence of Statute or Court Rule, 21 A.L.R. 819, 821-24 (1968).
1001 1
Hills: Current Status of the Traditional Duty of the Attorney to Serve w
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Century. ' 2 The culprit has been the greatly expanded modern right
to counsel.3
This Note will briefly review the usual justifications presented
by courts favoring the duty to serve, including its presumed roots
in English Common Law and professional tradition, in the critical
light of recent scholarship. It will then examine the constitutional
challenges that have been made to the duty in recent decades, as
well as the public policy argument against the duty.
Finally, this Note will survey the current state of the duty in the
case law of the federal system and all state systems. Although the
federal system still adheres strongly to the traditional duty,4 and the
United States Supreme Court strenuously avoids the issue, 5 an ap-
parent watershed point has now been passed in the state systems .6
Of those states which have confronted the issue, a definite majority
have departed to varying extents from the strict unmodified duty
of appointed service regardless of compensation.
II. THE DuTy PRESENTED
Under the early English Common Law, certain highly privileged
attorneys, the Sergeants-at-Law, who were officials of the court it-
self, were considered to be obligated to represent indigent parties
without compensation upon appointment by their court. 7 Harking
back to this tradition, American courts after the Revolutionary War
utilized such appointments in order to meet the requirements of state
statutes that counsel be provided to pauper defendants in criminal
proceedings.8 It is not clear, however, that this practice was either
frequent or burdensome due to that era's low incidence of actual
2. R. Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & CoM. 3, 9 (1969).
3. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 350, 747 P.2d 816, 830 (1987); Note,
Court Appointment, supra note I, at 367; Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 391-
93.
4. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
7. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 746.
8. See id. at 749-51; see also Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 367; Note, Uncom-
pensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 390.
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pauperism in a basically agrarian economy and to generally low
levels of attorney compensation (and qualifications) in the first place. 9
Almost any educated person could be appointed (or volunteer) to
defend an indigent.10
In the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, coincident to the
rise of industrialism and corresponding large increase in the pop-
ulation of the functional poor and also coincident to increasing pro-
fessionalization of the law as an occupational specialty, many courts
turned to uncompensated appointments as their only visible source
of compliance with state statutes, usually limited to capital or to
felony cases, which frequently called for free counsel to be provided
to defendants applying "in forma pauperis." The first attorney
protests to such appointment also date from this period, and courts
defended the uncompensated appointment system with the following
closely related justifications: 2 (a) The legal profession has since the
days of the early English Common Law borne a "traditional" duty
to so serve. (b) The attorney serves as an officer of the court and
thus bears a duty to obey the orders of the court, including this
one. (c) The attorney accepts admission to the bar with the knowl-
edge of his "traditional" duty as an officer of the court, and so
impliedly consents to appointments. (d) The legal profession assumes
the duty of providing such uncompensated service to the legal system
in return for the monopolistic privilege of providing legal services
for hire within that system. (e) The courts, in any case, have inherent
power to make such orders as may be necessary to assure the proper
administration and functioning of the justice system.
With a few noteworthy exceptions, the courts of most states and
of the Federal system utilized one or more of the foregoing argu-
ments to squelch the occasional attorney protest, and the duty of
9. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 8; Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 375 n.64.
10. See Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 375 n.64.
11. See generally Shapiro, supra note 1, at 749-53; Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1,
at 367-77.
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uncompensated appointed service to indigent defendants became the
firmly established rule. 3
Fair or not, the system was sufficiently stable to survive into the
1960's when the United States Supreme Court wrought a functional
revolution in indigent representation with Gideon v. Wainwright4
and its right-to-appointed-counsel progeny. Staggering under a del-
uge of cases involving constitutionally mandated provision of an
attorney for immensely expanded classifications of indigent criminal
defendants and already feeling the effects of a rising crime rate, the
state courts placed an increasingly onerous burden upon the mem-
bers of the criminal bar. 5
Although public defender systems and statutory systems of com-
pensation for appointments were instituted in most states to ease
this burden, these systems have suffered from low legislative priority
as spending money on criminals has never been a high-priority de-
mand of the public, and underfunding has required the courts to
impose on the private bar to take up the slack.16 The effect has been
very uneven resulting in little private bar economic burden in some
urban centers with good public defender services, but in extreme
economic loss to practitioners in areas, particularly rural counties
with few practitioners, where the full impact falls upon the few
available members of the private criminal bar.' 7 Two-thirds incidence
of free appointed cases in an individual attorney's case load is not
unknown. 8
13. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635-38 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382
U.S. 978 (1966) (basing rejection of an unconstitutional taking challenge upon duty of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and upon obligation which is part of the professional tradition assumed by
the lawyer). See generally Shapiro, supra note 1, at 749-53; Note, Court Appointment, supra note
1, at 370-71.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kans. 336, 350-51, 747 P.2d 816, 830 (1987).
See also Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 392. For a thorough discussion of
Gideon impact in West Virginia case law, see State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 816-
19, 227 S.E.2d 314, 320-22 (1976).
16. See Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 292-93 & 292 n.39, 412-13. See,
e.g., Jewel v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 545 (W. Va. 1989) (quoting amicus brief of practicing
attorney: "[Public defenders are viewed as a necessary nuisance-one which would not exist at all
if left to the public or the legislature, because the public doesn't believe that criminals should be
provided lawyers and the legislature doesn't want to pay for them.").
17. Hunter, supra note 2, at 9-12.
18. Jewell, 383 S.E.2d at 540.
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The result has been increasing attorney rebellion against and court
challenge to the "traditional" duty to serve without compensation
in recent decades.1 9 Such resistance has been bolstered by recent
scholarship which has tended to undermine the Common Law roots
of the "traditional" duty, particularly in finding that although the
Sergeants-at-Law, occupants of official and privileged positions in
the court structure, may have technically had such a duty, it was
quite rare for them actually to be so appointed. For the ordinary
barristers, that class of English lawyers most comparable to the mod-
ern American attorney, no such duty of uncompensated service ex-
isted. 20 Also, it would appear that the appointment of an attorney
for an indigent was a much more occasional occurrence than was
previously thought and was employed only where the court perceived
especially complex legal issues in the case of a felony accused. In
English and early American Common Law, it represented a principle
honored more in lip-service than in fact. 1
As Shapiro concluded, "To justify coerced, uncompensated legal
services on the basis of a firm tradition in England and the United
States is to read into that tradition a story that is not there."22
The currently formulated "traditional" duty to serve thus ap-
pears today as rather more the expedient creation of the late Nine-
teenth Century American courts than as a time-hallowed precept of
the law or as a central tenet of a coherent and continuous profes-
sional self-conception or dogma. 2
III. Tim DuTY CHALLENGED
A. Refutation of the Justifications
Many courts have found coerced uncompensated appointments
immune from constitutional scrutiny because attorneys are obligated
19. Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 398. See also Shapiro, supra note
1, at 756.
20. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 346-49. See also Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at
374.
21. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 740-53.
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as "officers of the court" to so serve (justifications (a) and (b) in
Part II above), or because the condition of such service is imposed
upon the attorney's license to practice law (justifications (c) and (d)
in Part II above),2 We have examined the historical problems with
application of these doctrines to modem American attorneys. 25
Additionally, the "officer of the Court" theory is probably con-
trary to the Supreme Court's finding in In re Griffiths that attorneys
are not comparable to public officials, such as bailiffs, under the
direct supervision of the court.7 And numerous cases have estab-
lished that state-imposed conditions upon conferment of a privilege
must pass constitutional muster.27 It is clear that no other regulated
professions bear such a burden of providing free service at the com-
mand of the court,2 and the idea that a profession should enjoy
"peculiar privileges" and be paid in "empty honors" belongs to a
"state of society hostile to liberty and equal rights. ' 29
As long ago as 1854, the Indiana Supreme Court in Webb v.
Baird held that the American legal profession had been "stripped
of all its odious distinctions and peculiar emoluments.''30 It is cer-
tainly not clear how any "monopoly" privilege accorded attorneys
today differs either substantially or categorically from that accorded
such professions as pharmacists or medical doctors. 31
Courts undoubtedly do have inherent power (as in justification
(e) above) to make such orders as may be necessary to their own
proper administration and functioning, but this in no way avoids
constitutional scrutiny of such use of state power.32 Such inherent
24. See Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 395-96.
25. See Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 373-75. See also Shapiro, supra note 1, at
739-55.
26. 413 U.S. 717, 727-29 (1973).
27. Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 376-77.
28. Hunter, supra note 2, at 10.
29. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16 (1854).
30. Id. at 17.
31. See Shapiro, supra note 1, 775-77 & 776 n.207; but see Note, Court Appointment, supra
note 1, at 388-89 (acknowledging monopoly is no distinction in itself, but further attempting to
distinguish law from other professions by its supposedly higher entrance requirement, its number of
tasks that could be performed by personnel with lesser qualifications and state regulation of the
monopoly as affecting demand).
32. See Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 373.
[Vol. 931006
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power is, in any case, at least equally cogent as justification for
compulsion of state payment for appointed attorney expenses as for
payment of any other expense of the system.
B. The Constitutional Arguments
1. Equal Protection
The equal protection argument against coerced uncompensated
or undercompensated appointment of counsel for the indigent is two-
pronged. First, attorneys are singled out as a class to provide services
in a way that other professions are not. Since attorneys are not a
suspect class, such classification need only bear a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental purpose.3 Assisting the indigent
is undoubtedly such a purpose, especially in criminal cases where
required by the Sixth Amendment.34 Under such a test, the tradi-
tional ethical obligation of the bar to provide such service is often
found to sustain the classification35 although many courts have com-
promised so as to find that it does so only in part, justifying com-
pensation under the market, but not justifying compensation less
than average attorney expenses of practice.3 6
Second, however, coerced undercompensated service tends in
practice to impact different classes of attorneys quite differently.
The burden falls primarily upon rural attorneys engaged in criminal
or general practice.37 Many urban lawyers, especially those engaged
in specialties such as corporate, patent, or probate law, may never
be called upon, due to lesser need and the inappropriate character
of their experience for providing adequate criminal defense.3 8 It is
difficult to articulate a rational basis for this kind of disparity. 39
33. State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 373, 747 P.2d 816, 844 (1987).
34. Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 378 (employing this conclusion under due process
analysis).
35. See, e.g., Lindh v. O'Hara, 325 A.2d 84, 94 (Del. 1974).
36. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 93 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853, 417 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (1981); State
ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 373-77, 747 P.2d 816, 844-46 (1987); State v. Robinson, 465
A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 546 (W. Va. 1989).
37. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 10-11.
38. Id. See also Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d at 541.
39. State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d at 845.
1991] 1007
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2. Due Process
Any qualification placed upon admission to the bar must have
a rational relationship to the applicant's fitness or capacity to prac-
tice lawA0 Taking coerced undercompensated service as a condition
of practice, then, requires finding that willingness to contribute free
service is an element of the good moral character necessary to prac-
tice law, if a rational basis is to be sustained. 41
Courts have tended to approach this analysis as a matter of de-
gree, attempting to draw a line between that amount of free service
which can reasonably be expected as a condition of practice and
amounts which by their own magnitude or by their uneven distri-
bution become arbitrary. 42 Thus, a due process analysis is rarely seen
in pure form in this area, as the factors which enhance the due
process or fundamental fairness argument are the same ones relied
upon in the equal protection and unconstitutional taking arguments
which, therefore, tend to subordinate the due process approach.43
Taking coerced service as a mere regulation of the legal pro-
fession, as at least one writer has done, rather than as a qualification
upon admission to practice, results in a less stringent form of ra-
tional basis review wherein only the rational relation of the measure
to the legitimate state goal of providing indigent defense is exam-
ined." If this degree of deference is required, the due process chal-
lenge to coerced service fails.
3. Unconstitutional Taking
In recent years, the most popular and successful argument against
undercompensated appointed service has been the Fifth Amendment
unconstitutional taking approach.45 "One who practices his profes-
sion has a property interest in that pursuit which may not be taken
from him or her at the whim of the government without due
40. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
41. Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 378 n.86.
42. See e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 361-64, 747 P.2d 816, 837-38 (1987).
43. See generally Shapiro, supra note 1, at 771, 773.
44. Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 377-78.
45. See infra notes 115, 120, 131, 136, 139 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 931008
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process." ' 46 As Shapiro points out, an obligation to perform work,
backed by the sanction of loss of livelihood, is the most direct pos-
sible invasion of a person's control over his own labor, and the
obligation is clearly designed to extract a public benefit from the
lawyer's time, not to prevent its use to cause harm. 47 Although com-
pensation is not always required to be paid for state action benefiting
some persons at the expense of others, 4 the requirement of com-
pensation appears to be governed by the extent and fairness of the
state interference, allowing courts to find unconstitutional taking at
some level of deleterious impact. 49
On this basis, a number of states have held that state compen-
sation statutes which dictate rates of compensation that are low in
terms of attorney overhead expenses or market rates for attorney
services fail to provide just compensation either absolutely or at
some volume of appointed cases. 50 Such courts have varied their
holdings broadly across a spectrum of constitutionally mandated
compensation requirements, from that of merely requiring reim-
bursement of out-of-pocket expenses, 51 through a position of re-
quiring compensation for average attorney overhead expenses,5 2
through a further position of requiring expense coverage plus some-
thing toward the attorney's living,53 to the Alaska stance of requiring
payment of fair market value ("the compensation received by the
average competent attorney operating on the open market"). 5 4
These results have been reached even by courts which do not
wholly reject the traditional duty, but which conclude that com-
pensation rates should "strike a balance between conflicting inter-
ests" such as the ethical obligation to make service available, on
the one hand, and the increasing burden of same on the profession. 55
46. State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d at 841.
47. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 774.
48. Id. at 773.
49. Id. at 773-75.
50. See infra notes 51-54.
51. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1216 (1981).
52. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 383, 747 P.2d 816, 849 (1987).
53. Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 538 (W. Va. 1989).
54. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987).
55. Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d at 546.
1991] 1009
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This approach lends particularly cogent support to finding uncon-
stitutional taking in the case of individuals or subclasses within the
bar where the hardship is not widely shared by the bar as a whole
(the usual case) .56 It is less cogent where the burden is equitably
distributed and not large.57
Opponents argue that a reciprocity of advantage exists for at-
torneys as a class, because of their "monopoly" of the practice of
law, which justifies the burden of taking of their services for the
public good.58 As we noted above, it is not convincingly clear why
this should be so with regard to attorneys as opposed to other li-
censed professions.59 And Shapiro concludes, with regard to attor-
neys as a class, that their modern numbers in the population, as
well as the increasing trend toward alternatives to adjudication, pre-
clude an easy conclusion that lawyers hold a state sponsored mo-
nopoly 0
Also, of course, the reciprocity argument falls down in the face
of unequal distribution of the burden of uncompensated appoint-
ment within the profession. 61
4. Involuntary Servitude
The argument that coerced attorney service violates the invol-
untary servitude prohibition of the thirteenth amendment has only
occasionally been successful in the courts, 62 having two substantial
hurdles to cross.
First, it is questionable that the self-executing prohibition of in-
voluntary servitude, absent Congressional enforcement legislation,
is applicable much beyond conditions of peonage closely related to
the exemplar condition of African slavery in this country.63 Although
56. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 775.
57. Id.
58. See Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 388-90.
59. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
60. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 776-77.
61. See id. at 775.
62. See id. at 768. See, e.g., Sparks v. Parker,. 368 So. 2d 528, 532-33 (Ala.), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 803 (1979).
63. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 768.
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a few courts have applied the prohibition broadly enough to include
coerced attorney service,6 the test for voluntariness generally has
been whether the threatened consequences of failure to perform in-
clude actual force or confinement, not mere loss of employment
opportunity. 65 Since American courts exercising their contempt power
over attorneys refusing to accept appointment have generally limited
their sanctions to a maximum of disbarment, rather than impris-
onment, such an attorney normally risks only his right to practice
law. 6 Of course, where the attorney is coerced by actual threat of
imprisonment for contempt, such a sanction probably would violate
current standards of thirteenth amendment voluntariness, whereas
performance of the same service at the risk of disbarment would
not.67
Second, assuming arguendo that the voluntariness standard is
met, the servitude argument must still demonstrate that coerced un-
dercompensated attorney appointment does not fall within the well-
established public service exception to the thirteenth amendment. 68
Although it can readily be argued that the very existence of the
exception conflicts with the plain language of the amendment,69 such
an argument goes far beyond the status of coerced attorney service
and would require the overturn of a long line of United States Su-
preme Court decisions in such areas as witness service and military
service. 70 Indeed, that Court has determined that court-appointed
attorney service in the criminal context is such a public service. 71
Even in a civil context, it is clear that assuring fairness in the
administration of justice would be a substantial state interest. 72 Al-
though it is equally clear that coerced attorney service does not fit
64. Id. at 768-69.
65. Id. at 770; Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 379.
66. See Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 379 & n.96. See e.g., State ex rel. Stephan
v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 378, 747 P.2d 816, 847 (1987).
67. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 770.
68. Id. at 769; Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 381.
69. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 769.
70. Id. at 769-70; Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 381- 82.
71. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973) (citing United States v. Dillon, 346
F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965)).
72. See Note, Court Appointment, supra note 1, at 382.
1991] 1011
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the usual public service mode of being a duty for which the great
mass of citizens are at risk, and which would thus tend to be an-
nullable legislatively if not acceptable to such mass,73 the arguments
for avoiding public service status on this basis tend to parallel those
of the equal protection and due process positions. 74
Thus, the involuntary servitude argument appears to offer much
hope of usefulness only in cases where, in a civil context, attorney
service is being coerced by threat of imprisonment for contempt,
and where equal protection and due process arguments are also being
made.
5. Right to Effective Counsel
"It is clear that the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. 75 Yet "[b]oth defense
system studies and current cases support the correlation between the
amount of money that is expended for defense services and the re-
sulting quality of representation received." '76 Numerous commen-
tators have expressed serious concerns whether appointed attorneys
providing free or undercompensated services will be able to provide
the same attention normally provided a paying client, either through
lack of availability of clerical or investigative services which must
be paid for, or through reduced motivation of the attorney who
knows that each hour he contributes to the case is failing to accrue
anything toward his overhead costs. 77
Some courts have held that merely because a system creates the
potential for ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient reason
to declare the system itself unconstitutional. 78 These courts believe
73. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 771-72 (although arguing the possibility that legislative clout
may qualify the legal profession in this respect).
74. See e.g., Note, Court Appointment, supra note I, at 381 & n.116 (regarding the reasonable
necessity limitation on public service even in areas of traditional state concern).
75. Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 542 (W. Va. 1989).
76. Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 398.
77. See A. Gilbert & W. Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Everyone-Even Lawyers,
12 PEPPmwn;n L. REv. 75, 87-89 (1984); Hunter, supra note 2, at 7-8; Note, Uncompensated Ap-
pointments, supra note 1, at 398-99. See also Okeechobee County v. Jennings, 473 So. 2d 1314, 1317-
18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 544 (WV. Va. 1989).
78. See e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 352- 53, 747 P.2d 816, 831 (1987).
1012 [Vol. 93
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/9
SER VICE WITHOUT COMPENSATION
that such cases would be infrequent and could be adequately handled
on a case by case basis on appeal.7 9 Yet the indigent criminal de-
fendant has been repeatedly found to believe that equal justice is
not in fact received by those who cannot afford to pay, and that
the best way to assure your attorney will take a personal interest
in and work hard for your case is to choose and pay him yourself.8 0
Courts have been reluctant to admit that a double standard may
exist in criminal representation, although some few attorneys have
done so."1 And not only are appellate courts largely unreceptive to
indigent claims of victimization by such a standard, but as a student
author has recently argued most cogently, current standards for con-
stitutional challenge to adequacy of counsel are set so high as to
admit of proof in only the most exceptionally egregious cases and
to fail entirely to detect and remedy such a dual standard in quality
of counsel.8 2
As Hunter aptly asserted over 20 years ago:
It has been said that the rich and the poor are equal in the eyes of the law; both
have the right to sleep under a bridge. A comparable statement would be that
the rich and the poor are equal in the eyes of the law since they both have a
right to counsel. But the rich are entitled to well-paid counsel who is happy about
his employment, while the unpaid counsel appears reluctantly, possibly bitter over
the imposition which has been cast upon him.83
C. The Public Policy Approach
The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically rejected constitu-
tional attacks on the duty to serve, but went on to hold that, as a
matter of public policy, the burden imposed by the duty under mod-
ern conditions had become too heavy for the bar to carry alone.
That court found authority to require compensation of appointed
attorneys in a state statute providing for payment of necessary ex-
penses for prosecution of criminal casesA8 A few other courts have
79. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d at 831-32.
80. See Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 399-400.
81. Id. at 405 & n.123, 407-08. See also Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 77, at 89.
82. Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 398-408.
83. Hunter, supra note 2, at 7-8.
84. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 759 (discussing State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966)).
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avoided constitutional and inherent authority issues altogether by
seeking such a statutory basis for court expense payment under which
to hold for compensation of appointed attorneys as a matter of
policy.85
Still other courts have found a state obligation to compensate
implied in the United States Supreme Court right-to-counsel deci-
sions,86 often combining this finding with a review of the greatly
expanded modern burden and acceptance of a constitutional taking
argument at some level of "unreasonable" burden.8 7 The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently reiterated the conclusion
of the Stephans court that "[t]he emerging view is that the re-
sponsibility to provide the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a
public responsibility that is not to be borne entirely by the private
bar."8 8
As opposed to a constitutionally based right to compensation,
the public policy approach would superficially seem to afford a much
weaker protection, subject to the winds of legislative and financial
change. Although never overruling its policy expressed in State v.
Rush,89 the New Jersey Court has more than once overridden the
attorney's statutory right to compensation in the face of an ex-
panding right to counsel which has outpaced funding allocations."
Under similar circumstances, however, the Missouri Supreme
Court, which had held that the provision of legal services to indigent
criminal defendants was constitutionally the burden of the state,91
has likewise waffled in the face of exhausted budgets, requiring the
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 288, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1974).
87. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 361-70, 747 P.2d 816, 836-42 (1987).
88. Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 543 (W. Va. 1989) (quoting State ex rel. Stephan v.
Smith, 747 P.2d at 841).
89. Rush, 217 A.2d at 44546, 448-49.
90. See In re Spann Contempt, 183 N.J. Super. 62, 68, 443 A.2d 239, 242-43 (1982) (imposing
burden of uncompensated representation pending allocation of funds by legislature); State ex rel.
Antonini, 53 N.J. 488, 494, 251 A.2d 291, 292 (1969) (declining full application of Rush to juvenile
cases due to lesser burden on the bar and newly enacted statute that would extend the Public Defender
to juvenile cases); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 759 n.120 (discussing Antonini); Note, Uncompensated
Appointments, supra note 1, at 411-12 (discussing Spann).
91. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971).
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bar to provide gratuitous service within limits, pending legislative
relief, 92 and failing to find statutory basis for expansion of the right
to compensation to attorneys representing indigent juvenile defen-
dants.93 Thus, the tendency of courts to vacillate when in dire fi-
nancial straits may not be too closely related to the basis for their
original holding in favor of compensation.
As Shapiro notes, the public policy issue involved here boils down
to this: "If legal services for those unable to pay are to be supplied
at any level higher than voluntary contributions will sustain, who
should pay the bill?" 94 That voluntary contributions can themselves
be increased sufficiently to sustain the expanded modern right to
counsel appears contradicted by the Italian experience with a total
charity model mandated by law.95 As long as the costs can be buried
in a "professional obligation," they may be the less readily dis-
cernible and thus the more readily imposed. 96 The greater the bur-
den, the more difficult this becomes, as witness recent history.
If neither attorneys (and their paying clients, to the extent the
burden can be passed on in higher fees)97 nor the public (through
legislative appropriation) are willing to meet the full burden on a
voluntary basis, then perhaps the issue must be resolved on a con-
stitutional basis, either by finding that the level of required services
can be constitutionally reduced, or in the likely alternative, by find-
ing that where a constitutional duty is imposed upon the state, the
burden to pay the costs associated with that duty is likewise so
imposed.
Judicial systems, struggling now for over twenty years to balance
the present constitutionally mandated right to counsel against the
92. State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 65-68 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982) (turning to the bar "without apology" for limited uncompensated service under temporary
guidelines due to funding shortfall); Comment, Appointed Pro Bono Defense: Involuntary Servitude
and/or an Unconstitutional Deprivation of Property?, 50 UMKC L. REv. 207, 208-09 (1982) (dis-
cussing Ruddy).
93. State ex rel. Cain v. Mitchell, 543 S.W.2d 785, 786-87 (Mo. 1976).
94. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 781.
95. See Note, Legal Assistance to the Indigent in Italy and the United States: Does Volunteer
Defense Really Work?, 11 BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 651, 675, 684-85 (1985) (concluding that the mandated
volunteer indigent defense system fails to provide effective and efficient counsel for indigents).
96. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 783.
97. For a brief discussion of burden-shifting and lawyer demand, see id.
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fiscal and service resources that can be made either voluntarily or
coercibly available to sustain that right, have had to wait far too
long for the United States Supreme Court to address this issue.
IV. THE DUTY ON THE WANE: THE CURRENT TREND AWAY
FRoM THE TRADTIONAL DUTY N nm STATE SYSTEMS
This writer was able to find relevant precedents in a total of
thirty-nine state systems. Of these, a total of sixteen states, a mi-
nority of those that have considered the issue, may be fairly char-
acterized as adhering to the unmodified traditional duty of the
attorney to represent the indigent for little or no compensation when
appointed by the court. Of these sixteen, the following eleven states
seem clearly committed to the traditional duty: Alabama; 98 Arkan-
sas;99 Delaware;'0° Michigan; 0 Minnesota;' ° Mississippi; 03 North
Carolina;04 Oregon; 0 5 Pennsylvania;0 6 Tennessee;"07 and Virginia.0 8
The following five states have also been included by this writer
in the minority group as substantially adhering to the unmodified
98. Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979) (tra-
ditional obligation of the bar; condition of license).
99. Arkansas County v. Freeman, 31 Ark. 266, 267-68 (1876); see also State v. Conley, 270
Ark. 139, 603 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1980) (no burden to pay absent statute; statutory amounts controlling).
100. Lindh v. O'Hara, 325 A.2d 84, 92 (Del. 1974) (public duty owed as an officer of the court).
101. In re Meizlish, 387 Mich. 228, 240-41, 196 N.W.2d 129, 134-35 (1972) (right to effective
counsel, due process, and equal protection challenges rejected).
102. State v. Dahlgren, 259 Minn. 307, 313, 107 N.W.2d 299, 303 (1961) (inherent Supreme
Court power to appoint; no power to appropriate money to compensate).
103. Board of Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So. 2d 420, 423 (Miss. 1970) (inherent court power to
appoint; no power to order expenditure of public funds). See also Young v. State, 255 So. 2d 318,
321-22 (Miss. 1971) (condition of license to practice; fee not so inadequate as to deny accused due
process).
104. In re Hunoval, 294 N.C. 740, 743, 247 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1977). See also State v. Davis,
270 N.C. 1, 10-12, 153 S.E.2d 749, 755-58 (1967) (no compensation absent statutory authorization).
105. Keene v. Jackson County, 3 Or. App. 551, 552-54, 474 P.2d 777, 777-78 (1970), petition
for review denied, 257 Or. 335, 478 P.2d 393 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971) (no com-
pensation absent statute; statute controlling). See also State v. Anderson, 239 Or. 362, 370, 397 P.2d
838, 842 (1964) (duty).
106. Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99, 103-05 (1879). See also Commonwealth v. Johnson,
409 Pa. 639, 644-45, 187 A.2d 761, 763 (1963) (statutory amount controlling).
107. Huskey v. State, 743 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tenn. 1988) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge).
See also House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690, 692 (1875).
108. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 803, 23 S.E. 784, 787 (1895) (dictum: no right to
refuse; compensation not discussed).
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traditional duty despite some "mixed signals" from their courts, in
varying degrees, or some expressed hesitation to extension of the
traditional duty into new areas of appointment where funding for
compensation has not been made available: Arizona;' °9 California;" 0
Georgia;"' Louisiana;"12 and New York." 3 It should also be noted
that certain of the minority group states have apparently been as-
sisted in maintaining their pro-duty position by the fact that they
have effective reasonable compensation statutes in place." 4
A total of twenty-three states, a new majority of those that have
considered the issue, may now be fairly characterized as departing
substantially from the unmodified traditional duty position along a
range extending from required compensation for out-of-pocket ex-
penses incurred to required full fair market value compensation for
appointed service. The positions of these states are briefly sum-
marized below:
109. Johnson & Douglas v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 407, 409 P.2d 566, 570 (1966), vacated,
101 Ariz. 373, 374-75, 419 P.2d 730, 732 (1966). In Johnson & Douglas, a trial judge had awarded
a "de facto" limit fee of $50.00 to an appointed attorney who had made five court appearances,
including two motion arguments, resulting in reduction of his client's charge from felony to mis-
demeanor, despite existence of a statute authorizing the court in its discretion to set reasonable com-
pensation. Arizona Court of Appeals, although acknowledging the duty to render public service incident
to the practice privilege, held that $50.00 was not reasonable in the circumstances. Arizona Supreme
Court held that the "de facto" limit did not conflict with the statute, and that the trial judge had
exercised discretion in an area in which he had jurisdiction to act.
110. Arnelle v. City and County of San Francisco, 141 Cal. App. 3d 693, 696, 190 Cal. Rptr.
490, 492 (1983) (asserting "settled in this state" that appointed attorney must serve gratuitously in
accordance with his duty). But see Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 495, 498-500,
74 Cal. Rptr. 771, 772-74 (1969) (finding implied authority to fix compensation).
111. Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 349, 350-51 (1873). But see Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga.
App. 343, 348-49, 148 S.E.2d 143, 146- 47, cert. denied 385 U.S. 958 (1966) (Georgia Court of Appeals
believed uncompensated service duty to be unconstitutional, but held itself bound by Elam).
112. State ex rel. Johnson, 475 So. 2d 340, 341-42 (La. 1985) (court has inherent power to
require attorney to represent indigent, with or without compensation, as a condition of practice and
as officer of court, but when "reasonably necessary," court may also use its inherent power to award
a reasonable fee from an appropriate source).
113. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 440-41, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56-57, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92-94 (1975)
(inherent court power to assign counsel in a proper case to serve without compensation, but "in-
judicious" to expand such to indigent divorce litigants). See also In re Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 495-
96, 166 N.E.2d 672, 676, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 663 (1960), but cf. Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285,
293, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721, 729-30 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd mem., 48 A.D.2d 904, 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (App.
Div. 1975) (trial court held uncompensated appointment to represent divorce litigant violated due
process).
114. See Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 77, at 79 (discussing California); Shapiro, supra note
1, at 758-59 (discussing California and New York).
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Alaska: Major change of position in 1987. Now requires "the compensation re-
ceived by the average competent attorney operating on the open market." Taking
argunent.is
Florida: Major change of position in 1986. Statutory maximum fee limitation
unconstitutional when applied in manner encroaching on court's inherent power
to ensure adequate representation and interfering with defendant's right to ef-
fective counsel.1"6
Illinois: Reasonable compensation should reimburse assigned counsel for his over-
head and yield something toward his own support."7
Indiana: Anti-duty position since 1854. Attorney cannot be required to serve with-
out compensation. Court has inherent authority to award expenses."'
Iowa: Since 1850, authority for compensation found in statute requiring appoint-
ment for indigents. As of 1984, attorney should receive "full" compensation
without any discount based on duty to represent the poor."9
Kansas: Major change of position in 1987. State obligation to fairly compensate
attorneys appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants at a rate which is
not confiscatory considering overhead and expenses. Taking and equal protection
arguments. 12o
Kentucky: Attorneys not required to accept appointments to represent indigent




Massachusetts: Authority to require compensation found in statute requiring coun-
ties to pay accounts allowed by the courts. (State has waffled between extending
the right to compensation to certain juvenile civil matters and affirming appoint-
ment without compensation in other such matters, apparently based on availability
of public funds.)' "
Missouri: Burden of furnishing legal services to indigent criminal defendants is
constitutionally the burden of the state, and attorneys should not be compelled
115. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987).
116. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112-13 (Fla. 1986). See also Remeta v.
State, 559 So. 2d 1132, 1135 (Fla. 1990); Okeechobee County v. Jennings, 473 So. 2d 1314, 1317-
18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
117. People v. Johnson, 93 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853-54, 417 N.E.2d 1062, 1065-66 (Il1. App. Ct.),
aff'd 87 Il.2d 98, 429 N.E.2d 497 (1981). See also People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d 24,
30, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966).
118. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 15-19 (1854). See also State ex rel. White v. Hilgeman, 218 Ind.
572, 575, 34 N.E.2d 129, 130 (1941); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind.
493, 509-11, 29 N.E.2d 405, 412-13 (1940).
119. Waiters v. Herrick, 351 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1984); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene
473, 474-78 (Iowa 1850).
120. State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 383, 747 P.2d 816, 849 (1987).
121. Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Ky. 1972).
122. Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 352 Mass. 719, 722-23, 227 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1967). See
also Department of Public Welfare v. J. K. B., 379 Mass. 1, 6, 393 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1979) (extending
state-compensated appointed counsel to indigent parents contesting adoption); but cf. Baird v. At-
torney General, 371 Mass. 741, 763-64, 360 N.E.2d 288, 301 (1977) (approving appointment when in
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to discharge that duty alone. (Considered to be still substantially in anti-duty
camp despite significant vacillations when under funding pressure.)' "
Montana: Major change of position in 1979-1981. Reasonable compensation must
reimburse the attorney for office overhead and expenses and yield something
toward his own support. 24
Nebraska: Appointment carries with it obligation on the part of state/county to
pay attorney reasonable fees and expenses for his services.2"
Nevada: Court has inherent authority to award expenses. Award of excess fees
is in discretion of trial judge.'12
New Hampshire: Attorney has duty to serve when appointed, but statutory com-
pensation rates are unconstitutional if they shift state's burden to legal profession.
Trial courts have authority to award rates which neither "unjustly enrich nor
unduly impoverish.","
New Jersey: Constitutional attacks on the duty rejected, but authority to require
compensation found under statute providing for payment of necessary criminal
prosecution expenses, and reasonable compensation required as a matter of public
policy. (Still considered to be substantially in anti-duty camp despite significant
vacillation under condition of funding shortfall.)12'
New Mexico: Attorney has duty to accept appointment, but court by rule may
award fees in excess of the established fee schedule where complexity of the case
warrants or exceptional circumstances exist.' 29
North Dakota: Attorneys accepting assignments in defense of indigents need not
expect to render services at less than the going rate charged by privately retained
counsel for such services.110
Oklahoma: Statute limiting fees unconstitutional as applied. Appointed attorney
to be reimbursed for extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses, but to be similarly
reimbursed for extraordinary professional services only where he is not able to
maintain his regular practice. Taking argument.'
3
'
123. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971). Cf. State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688
S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985) (courts have no inherent power to compel attorneys to serve in civil
actions without compensation). But see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text; Danforth v. Levitt,
540 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Mo. 1976) (holding trial judge was without power to order state to compensate
counsel for indigent defendants).
124. State v. Boyken, 196 Mont. 122, 637 P.2d 1193, 1195 (1981); State v. Allies, 182 Mont.
323, 597 P.2d 64, 65 (1979).
125. Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 818-23, 224 N.W.2d 761, 763-65 (1975). See
also State ex rel. Belding v. Belding, 192 Neb. 555, 556, 222 N.W.2d 835, 836 (1974).
126. County of Clark v. Smith, 96 Nev. 854, 856-57, 619 P.2d 1217, 1218-19 (1980); State v.
Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 85 Nev. 241, 245-46, 453 P.2d 421, 422-24 (1969).
127. State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 668-69, 465 A.2d 1214, 1216 (1983); Smith v. State, 118
N.H. 764, 769-70, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (1978).
128. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 405-09, 412-14, 217 A.2d 441, 445-46, 448-49 (1966). But see
supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
129. State ex rel. Robins v. Hodges, 105 N.M. 48, 728 P.2d 458, 458-59 (1986); but cf. Hale
v. Brewster, 81 N.M. 342, 344-45, 467 P.2d 8, 10-11 (1970) (duty to accept payment from court fund
as sole compensation).
130. Baer v. O'Keefe, 235 N.W.2d 885, 891 (N.D. 1975).
131. Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1271-73 (Okla. 1977).
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Rhode Island: Courts have statutory authority to require compensation of ap-
pointed attorneys.3 2
South Dakota: Attorneys may not be ordered by courts to represent indigents
without reasonable compensation. Trial court has discretion to determine rea-
sonableness, but must consider several specified factors and adequately explain
any modification of the requested fees.'
Utah: Statute requiring appointment of counsel in competency hearing without
available compensation unconstitutional. Attorneys appointed to represent indi-
gent criminal defendants have cause of action if claim properly filed with county
is rejected.'1'
Washington: Appointed attorney entitled to compensation from public funds in
an amount to be fixed by the court. Reasonable compensation must reimburse
the attorney for office overhead and expenses and yield something toward his
own support. 3 '
West Virginia: 1977 statutory limits on compensation, hours, and expenses con-
stituted unconstitutional taking by 1989, and implicated defendant's right to ef-
fective counsel. Compensation must strike balance between ethical obligation of
lawyer and the increasing burden on the legal profession. No lawyer may be
required to devote more than 10 percent of his normal work year to court-ap-
pointed cases.' 36
Wisconsin: Prohibition on payment of criminal defense fee invalidated. Court
could properly set rates in excess of those set forth in Supreme Court rule and
could properly set such rates before attorney accepted appointment. 37
In the federal system, precedents supporting the unmodified tra-
ditional duty to serve in criminal cases were found at the Circuit
Court of Appeals level in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Elev-
enth, and D.C. Circuits. 138 The only contrary precedent found was
132. State v. Hudson, 55 R.I. 141, 144-48, 179 A. 130, 131-32 (1935).
133. Tappe v. Circuit Court, 326 N.W.2d 892, 894-95 (S.D. 1982); Johnson v. City of Aberdeen,
272 N.W.2d 97, 101 (S.D. 1978).
134. Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 14-15, 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968); State
v. Dixon, 22 Utah 2d 58, 60, 448 P.2d 716, 717 (1968).
135. State v. Lehirondelle, 15 Wa. App. 502, 504, 550 P.2d 33, 34 (1976); Honore v. Washington
State Board, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 680, 466 P.2d 485, 496-97 (1970) (stating also that, at that time,
attorney had to file claim with legislature for payment).
136. Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 546-47 (W. Va. 1989). See also State ex rel. Partain
v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 813-14, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1976).
137. County of Door v. Hayes-Brook, 153 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15, 449 N.W.2d 601, 606-07 (1990);
County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 587-89 (1861). See also Feldner v. County of Milwaukee,
108 Wis. 2d 32, 36-37, 321 N.W.2d 123, 125 (1982) (where no specifically applicable provision for
payment of fees to appointed guardian ad litem appeared in statute, county of venue was required
to pay).
138. Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1987) (even if consent is prerequisite to
appointment, attorney validly consented after warned of disbarment); Family Division Trial Lawyers
v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 704-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejected involuntary servitude claim, but found
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the Eighth Circuit's holding in Williamson v. Vardeman that an
attorney appointed by a state court to represent an indigent criminal
defendant could not be ordered to advance expenses necessary to
the defense without an unconstitutional taking in violation of Four-
teenth Amendment due process.' 39 Even this case otherwise upheld
the constitutionality of compulsion of the attorney's services. 14°
These results confirm Shapiro's prior comment that it is well
established that federal courts may require lawyers to represent in-
digents in criminal matters.' 4 Ninth Circuit's United States v. Dillon'42
is considered the seminal case in the federal jurisdiction, and it is
often quoted, along with the United States Supreme Court's dictum
in Powell v. Alabama that attorneys are officers of the court and
are bound to render services when appointed, 4 3 by courts rejecting
or avoiding constitutional challenges along officer of the court and
duty of public service lines.
But the premises of Dillon have been substantially destroyed by
the research of Shapiro, 144 and Powell did not address the issue of
compensation for appointed attorneys. 4 5 Aside from the summary
dismissal of Sparks v. Parkery6 the United States Supreme Court
has consistently denied certiorari in cases that would have presented
that issue.' 47
Recently, the Supreme Court did act in Mallard v. United States
District Court to clarify that the language of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d),
material fact issues on taking claim); Wright v. Louisiana, 362 F.2d 95, 95 (5th Cir. 1966) (question
of compensation for attorneys appointed by state court is for state legislature); United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966) (rejected taking challenge based
on traditional duty of officer of the court); Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965)
(no right to compensation absent statute); Miller V. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962) (recognized no right to compensation). See also Nabb v. United States,
I Ct. Cl. 173, 173-74 (1864) (rejecting implied contract claim).
139. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1982).
140. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d at 1215.
141. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 756.
142. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
143. 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
144. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 740-53. See also Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 543
(W. Va. 1989).
145. See Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 395 n.55.
146. 444 U.S. 803 (1979).
147. See supra notes 13, 92, 105, 111, 138. See also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 757; Note, Un-
compensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 415.
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authorizing federal courts to "request" attorneys to represent in-
digent civil litigants, does not authorize them to require such service.'48
But the holding was limited strictly to statutory construction, did
not address criminal representation, and expressly did not consider
the issue of inherent authority of the court to require lawyers to
serve, a question not raised below.' 49
By itself, Mallard may not portend a break in the more than
two decade long "wall of silence"' 50 of the Supreme Court regarding
the traditional duty to serve, especially in light of last year's holding
in F. T. C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association that the Dis-
trict of Columbia boycott by private practice lawyers of indigent
criminal defense appointments, aimed at increasing the hourly com-
pensation paid, constituted a "classic restraint of trade" under the
Sherman Act.' 5' Although not directly on point, the majority's ready
support of the F.T.C.'s per se presumption of illegality "without
even requiring a showing that the participants possessed market power
or that their conduct triggered any anticompetitive effects ' "1 2 cer-
tainly gives little reason to believe that the Court has shed its ap-
parent traditional lack of concern for compensation levels of indigent
defense lawyers.
And it must be remembered that Justice Brennan, who wrote
the opinion in the five-to-four Mallard decision and the dissent in
F. T. C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, is now among
the missing.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the unmodified "traditional" duty of the attorney to
serve with little or no compensation upon appointment by the court
remains enshrined within the federal system, 53 the state systems,
acting under pressure of a much magnified modern right-to-counsel
burden and without guidance from the United States Supreme Court,
148. 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1818-21 (1989).
149. 109 S. Ct. at 1822-23.
150. Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at 415.
151. 110 S. Ct. 768, 774-76 (1990).
152. 110 S. Ct. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
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have evolved away from that doctrine. 154 Today, state jurisdictions
departing from the traditional duty constitute a fifty-nine percent
majority of the state systems that have considered the issue, and
the trend would suggest continued deviation.
As prior commentators have frequently urged, only the United
States Supreme Court can satisfactorily resolve the issue.1 55 By now,
that Court will cause substantial dislocations no matter which way
it goes.
Henry M. Hills
154. See supra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
155. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 12; Note, Uncompensated Appointments, supra note 1, at
398, 415-16; Comment, supra note 92, at 218.
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